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I. INTRODUCTION
My intention throughout this paper is to present an overview
of Castro's systematic assault on private ownership spanning the
last four decades and give the reader a sense of the inextricable
intertwining of constitutional, political, and economic liberties in
Cuba (as illustrated by the United Nations' 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights) and how effectively this delicate
fabric can be torn asunder. There are several serious problems with
conducting a legal analysis of the structure of a totalitarian regime.
In addition to the indisputable fact that official reports emanating
from the Castro regime are frequently manipulated, often anecdotal
and even contradictory, there is also considerable divergence
between the dejure "laws on the books" and defacto reality on the
island. Despite the existence of some state decrees which, on their
face, seem to sanction something akin to the private ownership of
some homes and small farms, as well as the more recent
establishment of commercial joint ventures between the Cuban
regime and certain foreign companies (empresas mixtas), these
relatively insignificant "property rights" are too restricted to
approach classical or Western notions of private property.1
II. THE 1940 CONSTITUTION
Cuba's 1940 Constitution [hereinafter Constitution], which
Fidel Castro and his followers professed an intention to restore after
its partial suspension by General Fulgencio Batista's 1952 coup
d'etat, was already being amended within the first fortnight of the
revolutionary regime's reign. On January 13, 1959, Castro's
Council of Ministers [hereinafter Council] usurped the right to
amend the Constitution, in derogation of the requirements set forth
in Articles 285 and 286. In order to amend the Constitution, these
articles required: (1) popular or congressional initiatives approved
by a super-majority of the National Assembly or (2) the convening
1. Douglas E. Matthews, Real Property Law Under the Current Cuban
Regime, 3 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 137 (1995).
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of a plebiscitary assembly, in order to approve an amendment to the
Constitution.2
With its new-found power, the Council, as part of this first
amendment, promptly modified Article 24 of the Constitution
protecting private property. This revision (in italics) read, in
pertinent part:
Confiscation of property is prohibited. However,
confiscation is authorized in the case of property of
natural persons or corporate bodies liable for
offenses against the national economy or the public
treasury committed during the tyranny which ended
on December 31, 1958, as well as in the case of
property of the tyrant and his collaborators. No one
can be deprived of his property except by competent
judicial authority and for a justified cause of public
utility or social interest, and always after the
payment of the corresponding indemnity in cash, as
fixed by a court. . .. '
The Council, however, did not limit the initiation of its
assault on human rights to the area of economic liberties. Its first
amendment also authorized for the first time the retroactive
application of criminal laws and the death penalty for political
causes 4
2. Ignacio E. Sanchez, Cuban Properly Rights and the 1940 Constitution,
3 FLA. ST. U. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. & POLICY. 135, at 141 (1994).
3. Cuba and the Rule of Law, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JuRisTs 87
(1962).
4. Id.
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III. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW
In order to provide further quasi-legal cover for its scheme
to confiscate all private property in Cuba, from the large sugar
mills and cattle ranches down to the smallest bodegas (small
groceries) and homes, the Castro regime effectively repealed the
Constitution on February 7, 1959, replacing it with the
Fundamental Law [hereinafter the Law]. Going a substantial step
further than General Batista's (extra-constitutional) Constitutional
Act of 1952, the Law incorporated much of the Constitution, but
went on to make the unelected Council the supreme legislative
body, giving it the authority to amend the Law. This effectively
"constitutionalized" the January 13th amendment to Article 24 of
the Constitution.5
The Law was intended to be in effect for only one year, in
order to facilitate the introduction of the revolutionary regime's
"reforms.",6 Although the Law did not specifically purport to repeal
the Constitution, and it was not enacted under the Constitution's
amendment mechanism, the Castro regime proceeded for the next
seventeen years as though the Law had indeed replaced the
Constitution.7 Although the text of the Law did not vary from that
of the Constitution with respect to its private property clause,8 the
expropriation clause of the Law9 now included an exception (which
would swallow the rule) with the retroactive effect of allowing the
confiscation of those properties which belonged to the former
Batista dictatorship and its "collaborators."1 0
5. Sanchez, supra note 2, at 13.
6. Juan C. Consuegra-Barquin, Cuba's Residential Property Ownership
Dilemma: A Human Rights Issue Under International Law, RUTGERS LAW REV.,
873, 896 (1994).
7. Id. at 897-898.
8. LEY FUNDAMENTAL [Constitution] art. LXXXVII (Cuba).
9. Id. at art. XXIV; 1940 Constitution art. XXIV (Cuba).
10. LEY FUNDAMENTAL art. XXI, XXIV (Cuba).
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IV. THE AGRARIAN REFORM ACT
Seriously undermining the revolutionary regime's
commitment to the rule of law in general, and the protection of
private property in particular, between February 7, 1959 and
August 23, 1961, the Law was amended sixteen times." It was
significantly amended by the proclamation of the Agrarian Reform
Act [hereinafter the Act] on June 3, 1959.12 The Act, coupled with
another agrarian reform law in '1963, effectively confiscated
approximately 63% of Cuba's arable land from its legitimate
owners. 13 These enactments involved the confiscation of all farms,
whose area exceeded five caballerias 4 Although about 45,000
farmers retained smaller farms, and smaller parcels were allotted to
almost 100,000 tenants, sharecroppers, and squatters, the Castro
regime has steadily forced, rather than persuaded,"5 these small land
holders to "sell" their holdings to the State at a price the State
deemed appropriate. As a result, the State currently directly
occupies approximately 83% of Cuba's cultivated land.16 The
remainder breaks down into collective farms or cooperatives
covering 15% of the cultivated land, mostly Cooperativas de
Produccion Agropecuaria and small private farms comprising 2 %
of the cultivated land worked by about 20,000 small farmers. 7
Although the Cuban regime has recently denounced an expansion
11. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 3, at 98.
12. Gaceta Oficial [Official Gazette], Special Ed. No. 7 (Jun. 3, 1959).
13. See generally JOHN P. RATHBONE, PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CUBA
(1992). See also Farmland, Bulletin of La Sociedad Economica de Amigos del
Pais, No. 16 (Apr. 8, 1992).
14. One caballeria equals 33 acres or 13.4 hectares.
15. Medea Benjamin et al., Economic Transformation in the 1960's and
1970's, THE CUBAN READER: THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY, 89,
96 (1989).
16. Rathbone, supra note 13, at 1.
17. 1d.
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of the cooperativas, there is little evidence that any significant
changes are being implemented.
As significant caveats to the semi-private nature of these
small farmers, it should be noted that: (1) their average holding is
only about 12.6 hectares (165 acres); (2) they cannot freely sell
their land without the authorization of the appropriate state agency;
(3) the State dictates what is to be grown on their land; (4) they are
completely dependent on the state for agricultural inputs,
transportation, credit, marketing, and distribution (through the
woefully inefficient Centros de Acopio); (5) part of the produce that
they harvest must be "sold" to the State at prices established by the
State; (6) the obstacles to property transfers include an expansive
right of first refusal reserved by the State; and (7) there are
burdensome restrictions on the inheritance of these properties. 8
When the constitutionality of the Act was challenged before
the Court of Constitutional and Social Guarantees [hereinafter the
Court] on the basis that it violated both Articles 24 and 87 of the
Constitution, the Castro-controlled judiciary simply held that:
[I]t is also the doctrine of this Court that such
standards regulating the right of property cannot be
invoked with regard to property falling under the
special system of the Agrarian reform, which is
subject to special provisions laid down by the Act
and is on equal footing with the Constitution.19
The Court went on to say that the enforcers of the Act may
occupy any property affected without applying the "organs of
ordinary jurisdiction," and without the requirement for prior
compensation to the legitimate owners of these properties.E°
18. Benjamin et. al., supra note 15, at 96-97.
19. Court of Constitutional and Social Guarantees, Judgment No. 45.
20. Id.
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V. STRIPPING PROPERTY RIGHTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION
Once again, on November 22, 1959, the Council amended
Article 24 of the Constitution to permit the confiscation of property
from the following new categories of persons:
(1) Persons found guilty of offenses defined by law
as counter-revolutionary; (2) Persons evading the
action of the revolutionary courts by leaving the
national territory in any manner whatsoever; and (3)
Persons who, having left the national territory,
perform conspiratorial acts against the revolutionary
government.2
This proclamation was the revolutionary regime's response to the
ever-growing counter-revolutionary insurgency, coupled with the
flight of many thousands of Cubans into exile.
On July 5, 1960, the original text of Article 24 of the
Constitution was again altered, in relevant part, as follows:
[N]o other natural or juridical person can be
deprived of his property except by competent
authority and for a justifiable cause of public utility
or social or national interest. The law shall regulate
the procedure for expropriation and shall establish
legislation and forms of payment and shall determine
the competent authority to declare the case to be of
public utility or social or national interest and that
expropriation is necessary.2
This seemingly unconstitutional amendment is the proverbial
linchpin of the Castro regime's strategy to remove individual
property rights from their constitutionally-protected sphere and
21. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 3, at 100.
22. Id. at 104.
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subject them to "revolutionary justice." Following the above-
mentioned alteration, Article 24 states that "no other natural or
juridical person can be deprived of his property except by
competent authority," rather than "competent judicial authority" as
it previously read. 23  Furthermore, although the original text
included in the expropriation clause the phrase "and always after
payment of appropriate compensation in cash," the amended text
deleted this condition without a specific commitment to any
compensation.24  As a further weakening of the former
constitutional private property protection, "national interest" is
added as another permissible basis justifying confiscation.' For
good measure, this amendment deleted the clause of Article 24 of
the Constitution, which allowed the confiscated party to appeal to
the courts for restitution of its property.2 6 As a further deformity
to Article 24 of the Constitution, on January 24, 1961, the category
of property subject to confiscation was stretched to nearly carte
blanche proportions to also encompass the property of "those
deemed necessary by the Government in order to prevent acts of
sabotage, terrorism or any other counter-revolutionary activities."27
The Castro regime also authorized the confiscation without
compensation of the real and personal property of those Cubans
who left the country for at least one to three months through Law
No. 98928 and the related Resolution No. 454.29 These
confiscations were primarily measures taken against the exile
opposition to the regime, both to punish the "traitors" who left, as
23. Id. See also Gaceta Official, Special Edition, No. 21, (Sept. 28, 1960).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Sanchez, supra note 2, at 16.
27. Gaceta Oficial, Special Ed., No. 1 (Jan. 4, 1961).
28. Gaceta Oficial, p. 23, 705 (Dec. 6, 1961).
29. Gaceta Oficial, p. 19, 310 (Oct. 9, 1961).
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well as to provide disincentives for the economically damaging
"brain drain" of Cuban professionals leaving the country.
VI. LAW NUMBER 851 AND LAW NUMBER 890
This last amendment cleared the way for the executory phase
of the Castro regime's confiscatory scheme. On August 6, 1960,
amidst a flurry of anti-imperialist rhetoric, all of the businesses in
Cuba owned by citizens of the United States were individually
listed in Law No. 851 in that day's Gaceta Oficial. These
businesses were forcibly expropriated by the revolutionary regime,
with only vague and unrealistic language that the issue of
compensation would be determined at a later date.3"
Two months later, Law No. 890 forcibly confiscated
virtually the entire diversified Cuban-owned industrial sector,
including sugar mills, distilleries, alcoholic beverage plants,
detergent factories, perfumeries, dairy producers, confectioners,
wheat mills, container makers, paint producers, chemical
companies, paper companies, metallurgists, lamp makers, textile
industries, rice mills, food producers, edible oil producers,
wholesale food distribution warehouses, coffee mills,
pharmaceutical industries, department stores, railroad companies,
printers, cinematographers, construction companies, electric
utilities, and maritime industries, as well as all of their related
subsidiaries and affiliates.31 Law No. 890 merely stated that "the
means and forms of payment for the indemnification which
corresponds to the natural or juridical persons affected by the
expropriation directed by this Law shall be regulated in accordance
with a future law. "32 Needless to say, just as with the confiscation
of the American-owned industries, compensation was never paid to
any of the Cuban owners.
30. Gaceta Oficial, Special Ed., No. 24 (Oct. 15, 1960).
31. Gaceta Oficial, Special Ed., No. 24 (Oct. 15, 1960).
32. Id. at7.
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VII. THE URBAN REFORM ACT
That very same month, the Castro regime enacted an urban
version of the Act, which also stripped constitutional protection
from property and contract rights in yet another important societal
area. Article 2A of the Urban Reform Act specifically prohibited
all types of leasing and sub-leasing agreements. 3  The Urban
Reform Act went beyond proscribing any future leases. The Act
rendered all existing leases of urban property null and void.34
Through the Urban Reform Act, the Castro regime ordered the
compulsory sale of urban houses and apartments at prices fixed by
the state.35 In order for any Cuban citizen to sell or transfer a house
or apartment, the consent of the Council of Urban Reform was now
required.36
In addition, rents for government-built housing were capped
at no more than 10% of household income.37 Between 1959 and
1988, nearly 1.4 million new housing units were built in Cuba.
However, about half of this total housing stock is considered to be
substandard.38
VIII. THE 1976 CONSTITUTION
On February 24, 1976, long after Fidel Castro seized power
in Cuba and imposed the Law outside the framework of the
Constitution as a "temporary" measure, he decreed a new and
33. Gaceta Oficial, Special Ed., No. 23 (Oct, 14, 1960).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Sanchez, supra note 2, at 147.
37. J. HAMBERG, HOUSING POLICIES IN THE SOCIALIST THIRD WORLD, 35, 38
(Kosta Mathey ed., 1990).
38. Id. at 37.
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thoroughly communist "constitution. 3 9 The nearly two-decade
delay in drafting a new constitution is indicative of the Castro
regime's contempt for legal restraints on state authority. 4° By way
of comparison, the U.S. Constitution was drafted to replace the
Articles of Confederation only four years after the 1783 Treaty of
Paris. 4' The fact that the U. S. Constitution was submitted to the
thirteen new states for ratification only four years after the end of
the war, despite the relatively limited communications of the late
eighteenth century, further emphasizes the comparative disregard of
the Castro regime for legal restraints on state authority.
Article 9 of the 1976 Constitution confesses that laws "are
to echo only the will of the working people," and that only
"socialist legality" is binding on the State, which is to be officially
controlled by the Communist Party.4' Since there is neither national
nor international consensus as to what constitutes "socialist
legality," Article 9 has the de facto effect of providing
"constitutional" cover for the official repression of all opponents of
the communist police state.43
On the specific question of property rights, Article 14
prescribes the following: "An economic system based upon the
socialist ownership of all the people over the means of production
and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man rules in the
Republic of Cuba."' Article 15 goes even further in specifying,
non-exclusively, which properties become "irreversibly established"
as the assets of "the entire people," as represented by the State.
39. PAMELA S. FALK, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD
WORLD: CUBA. (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1979).
40. BRUCE FEIN, CASTRO'S 1976 CUBAN CONSTITTION: INSTITUTIONALIZING
OPPRESSION OF CUBAN CITIZENS AND SCORNING THE 1948 UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3.
41. This treaty officially ended the American War of Independence.
42. FEIN, supra note 40, at 10.
43. Id.
44. 1976 CONST., art. 14 (Cuba).
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[T]he land that does not belong to the small
producers or the cooperatives formed by the same,
the subsoil, the mines, the maritime and natural
resources-both living and not living-within the area
of the republic, the forests, the waters and the means
of communication; the sugar mills, factories, basic
means of transportation; and overall the enterprises,
banks, installations and goods that have been
nationalized and expropriated from the imperialists,
large landholders and members of the bourgeoisie;
as well as over the people's farms, factories,
enterprises and economic, social, cultural and sports
facilities built, fostered or purchased by the state and
those which will be built, fostered or purchased by
the state in the future.45
IX. THE 1992 AMENDMENTS
The 1976 Constitution served as a thorough codification of
the Castro regime's communist ideology and officially nationalized
any private ownership over the means of production that may have
arguably survived the earlier revolutionary period. Faced with the
collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics itself (which meant a fairly abrupt end to
the $6-8 billion annual subsidy received from the former U.S.S.R.),
the Castro regime has been forced to engage in a curious, neo-
mercantilist practice of "state capitalism," in order to attract foreign
investment.46
Under Law-Decree 50 (enacted on February 15, 1982 and
elevated to "constitutional" status by Article 23 of the 1976
Constitution on August 1, 1992), the empresas mixtas are
determined to be joint commercial ventures with foreign entities, in
which the State is typically awarded a controlling interest. These
joint ventures currently exist in the areas of tourism, mining,
45. 1976 CONST., art. 15 (Cuba).
46. Franklin Hoet & Jose F. Valdivia, III, Mining in Cuba, LATIN AMERICAN
REPORTER, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May/June 1994).
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textile, communications, real estate, petroleum, construction,
manufacturing, cement, sugar and other agricultural sectors.47 The
foreign companies contract with the relevant Cuban state corporate
entities to provide them with local workers. Unrestricted by any
minimum wage, right-to-strike, collective bargaining, or other labor
protections, not to mention any environmental, antitrust, and capital
repatriation restrictions, these companies pay the workers' wages,
in the corresponding hard currency, directly to the state
corporation. The State, in turn, pays these workers, in nearly
worthless Cuban pesos, a portion of their wages, discounting from
them an additional amount as rent for the use of the confiscated
homes in which these workers reside.
The following italicized language was added to Article 15 of
the 1976 Constitution, in order to facilitate the creation of the
empresas mixtas.
These properties and installations cannot be
transferred to any persons or corporations, except in
cases in which the property is transferred in order to
be used in the economic and social development of
the country . . .with the prior approval of the
Council of Ministers or its Executive Committee.48
To those who are heartened by the enactment of the 1992
Amendments to the 1976 Constitution as a perceived step towards
Cuba's gradual return to capitalism and re-integration into the world
economy, the speaker of Cuba's National Assembly had these
cautionary words: "Let the enemy not be deceived. They will find
nothing in this text that implies retreat, nor return to the past,
because we bow to no pressure. "49
47. Paul B. Carroll, Mexico Plays Growing Role in Helping Cuba Withstand
U.S. Trade Embargo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1994, at A7.
48. Matthews, supra note 1, at 149.
49. Cuba's New Constitution: Better or Worse?, 1 THE CUBA REPORT 1
(1992).
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X. CONCLUSION
The Constitution is still internationally regarded as the
model for several new Iberian and Latin American democracies.
Despite some of its more overtly interventionist and paternalistic
provisions, it was certainly a very enlightened and progressive
document for its day. Regardless of its faults, it is the last
legitimate expression of the constitutional will of the Cuban people.
In order to bring Cuba permanently out of its uncontrollable tailspin
of disregard for constitutionalism and its concomitant political,
economic, and social misery, Cuba must nullify the 1976
Constitution as the starting point for its requisite national
reconstruction and development. Needless to say, a constituent
assembly will have to be convened expeditiously, in order to amend
or even replace the Constitution according to its mechanisms
established for this purpose. This process, however, will foster
badly needed popular respect for the national institutions of the new
republic.
With respect to the specific issue of property rights, prompt
and full restitution of all non-materially altered industrial,
commercial, and agricultural properties to their legitimate owners
will carry out the justice required for social peace. It will also
place the means of production in the hands of those entrepreneurs
who had elevated Cuba to the top of nearly every single socio-
economic index in Latin America, prior to the communist
revolution. By creating constitutional and other legal incentives to
encourage the unleashing of the creative energies of the Cuban
people, both on the island and in exile, Cuba can rapidly earn
foreign exchange through exports, produce abundantly for its own
domestic consumption, employ workers at real jobs paying in a
currency that has value, and restore civil labor, and other societal
rights. The economic multiplier effect of this combined economic
activity will rapidly return prosperity to the island.
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